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Abstract
Competition policy refers to a set of laws and policies that aim to ensure that competition in the 
marketplace is not restricted, such as laws that prohibit agreements to keep prices artificially high or 
markets segmented. In the last few decades, we have witnessed a proliferation of national competition 
laws, regional and bilateral cooperation agreements and efforts at multilateral cooperation on competition 
issues. The European Union has been an important player shaping these developments being one of the 
strongest competition authorities in the world. In this paper, I investigate the role of the EU in shaping 
developments on competition policy at the international level. While the EU’s attempts at creating a truly 
global competition order through the World Trade Organization failed, the EU continues to ‘export’ its 
competition regime to its economic partners through bilateral and regional agreements, and informal 
dialogue with competition authorities around the world. This paper explores the conditions under which 
the EU’s attempts at internationalizing competition policy have been successful. 
Competition policy refers to the set of laws and policies that aim to ensure that competition in the 
marketplace is not restricted, such as laws that prohibit agreements to keep prices artificially high or 
markets segmented. In the last few decades, interest in competition policy has exploded: over a hundred 
countries now have competition laws compared to around twenty in the 1980s. In addition to the 
proliferation of national competition laws, international efforts at cooperation on competition laws and 
their enforcement have multiplied. More than twenty bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements 
exist on various aspects of competition. 
The proliferation of national, bilateral and multilateral competition regimes has created opportunities 
for global cooperation on competition issues. Yet, attempts at establishing international cooperation on 
competition policy have had mixed success. Existing international organizations that work on competition 
policy related issues either have limited membership (EU) or aim at informal cooperation (UNCTAD, 
International Competition Network) or both (OECD). The World Trade Organization established a 
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy in 1996 as an initial step 
towards cooperation, but its General Council ended the activity of the Working Group in 2004 (Cini and 
McGowan 2009). Currently there is no formal multilateral competition regime at the global level. Instead, 
what exists is a dense web of cooperation agreements and institutions that take bilateral or limited 
multilateral forms. 3
The EU has been the most ardent supporter of the global competition policy initiative within the 
framework of the WTO. The international aspect of competition policy has been a priority and a 
challenge for the European Commission since the early 1990s. This paper investigates the role of the EU 
in shaping developments on competition policy at the international level. I argue that the failure of the
WTO initiative does not signify that the EU’s efforts at internationalizing competition policy proved 
unsuccessful. While attempts at creating a truly global competition order through the WTO failed, the EU 
continues to ‘export’ its competition regime to its economic partners through bilateral and regional 
agreements, and informal dialogue with competition authorities around the world. The paper explores and 
evaluates EU’s various attempts at internationalizing competition policy and the conditions under which 
they have been successful. My argument is that in an international environment in which a multilateral 
competition regime could not be established, the EU’s most successful strategy has been to work 
bilaterally to convince its trade partners to adopt competition laws along the lines of EU’s competition 
policy. This has worked relatively well for countries at the EU’s periphery, such as candidates and 
prospective candidates. With stronger trade partners such as the United States (US), however, the 
relationship is more complicated. The EU finds that it is frequently at the receiving end of policy 
influences from the US, and uses bilateral and informal multilateral networks in order to manage this 
relationship on a more equal footing.
Analyzing the EU’s attempts at internationalizing competition policy is significant for two reasons. 
First, such an investigation will provide insights into the EU’s role in international competition policy. 
Having developed possibly the most rigorous multilateral competition policy regime in the world, the EU 
has visions of extending this regime beyond its borders. In addition to pursuing such a vision, at a 
practical level, the EU and its member states, as well as other countries have to cope with a heightened 
possibility of anti-competitive behavior that transcends borders. The paper attempts to shed light on to 
how the evolution of EU’s own competition regime shapes its international strategies, and how successful 
these have been in helping the EU achieve its objectives in protecting and promoting competitive markets. 4
Second, exploring the EU’s role in global competition policy issues also gives clues to its evolving role in 
the global economy. Under what conditions is the EU likely to project a strong vision and be able to 
achieve its goals in the global economy? The paper begins to address some of these issues by focusing on 
EU’s international competition policy agenda. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section discusses the developments in competition 
policy issues at the international level, focusing on two parallel trends of widespread diffusion of national 
competition laws and the intensification of efforts to cooperate on competition policy issues at the 
international level. The third section focuses on the strategies that the EU has followed in trying to shape 
these two trends and the effectiveness of its strategies. The fourth and final section draws some 
conclusions of the competition policy case for the broader context of EU’s external economic relations. 
The Internationalization of Competition Policy
Competition policy refers to a number of regulatory activities that are aimed at ensuring competitive 
markets, including merger review, cartel and monopoly policies (Damro 2006, 5). Competition laws 
prohibit practices and policies that seek to exclude or discriminate against rival firms or that intend to 
reduce competition among incumbent firms (Ibid, 5). For instance, competition laws prohibit cartels, 
which are secret agreements “between competitors who in coordination fix or increase their prices, 
restrict supply by limiting their sales or their production capacities, and/or divide up their markets or 
consumers” (Commission 2004, 2). Merger review seeks to ensure that a merger does not reduce 
competition in a market by creating or strengthening a dominant player. The underlying objective of 
various domestic competition laws is to promote competition, with the belief that doing so will increase 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare (Cini and McGowan 1998, 2-3; Damro 2006, 5). 
Competition law and policy have become more salient in the last twenty years around the world. 
There are two sides to this development: first, a large number of countries have adopted national 
competition laws in a relatively circumscribed time period, and second, bilateral, regional and multilateral 
efforts to cooperate on competition policy issues have intensified. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of5
EU’s strategies to influence competition policy developments at the international level, we need to 
explore both of these developments in the sphere of competition policy. 
The popularity of competition laws is a relatively new phenomenon. Only the United States, Canada 
and Australia had competition laws prior to World War I. Several European countries took steps in this 
direction in the 1920s. For instance, Germany had considered adopting laws to protect competition in the 
late 19
th century, and after some unsuccessful attempts adopted legislation in this direction in the 1920s 
(Gerber 2006, 20-1). After World War II, the awareness and the acceptance of competition policy 
increased mostly due to the US efforts. Several European countries and Japan adopted competition laws. 
Many of the initiatives to develop competition policies in the European countries relied on the legal and 
institutional lessons drawn from the US experience, and were encouraged actively by the United States 
(Damro 2006, 31; Cini and McGowan 1998, 9).
1
The US also supported attempts at establishing a pan-European competition policy, the first effort for 
which is materialized in the Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 
followed by the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome (1957) establishing the European Economic 
Community. The European Community’s competition policy developed gradually and incrementally for 
the first two decades largely as a reactive policy, and since the 1980s, as a much more active one (Cini 
and McGowan 1998, 30). Moreover, the scope of EU’s competition policy has widened gradually: in the 
1960s competition policy focused on restrictive practices, in the 1970s, it started tackling monopolies, and 
in the 1980s and 1990s, it has expanded into merger control and monitoring of state subsidies (Ibid, 36). 
In addition to spreading competition laws throughout Europe, the US sought more widespread 
diffusion of competition laws throughout the world. The Charter of the failed International Trade 
Organization included provisions dealing with anticompetitive behavior internationally, and required the 
members of the organization to adopt competition laws. With the failure of the organization the diffusion 
                                                
1 However, most authors also point to the influence of an interwar school of thought originating in the Weimar 
Republic. This ordoliberal thinking emerged among a number of lawyers and economists belonging to the so-called 
Freiburg school in the 1930s, and was influential in the adoption of an antitrust law in Germany in 1957 (Amato 
1997; Weinrauch 2004). 6
of competition laws in the 1950s and 1960s remained limited. Through the 1970s and 1980s, competition 
laws spread steadily to countries in different regions of the world with varying degrees of income. 
------ FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ------
The explosion in competition law adoption came in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, as seen in 
Figure 1. Central and Eastern European and former Soviet countries going through market reforms 
contributed to this explosion, but the wave of competition policy adopters were not limited to these. As 
Figure 2 demonstrates, most regions saw an upsurge in competition law adoptions in the 1990s. 
Competition law adoptions continued around the world through the 2000s.
------ FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE -------
Competition law adoptions show variations across regional lines. Table 1 presents the regional 
breakdown of countries with competition laws in 2006. It is in Europe and Central Asia that we see the 
highest proportion of countries with such laws, followed by the Americas, East Asia and the Pacific, and
South Asia. In all of these regions, more than half of the countries have adopted laws to protect 
competition. The Middle East, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are the regions in which competition 
laws have diffused the least, but even in Sub-Saharan Africa, a quarter of countries have adopted such 
laws. 
------ TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE -----
In parallel to the development to the horizontal spread of competition laws around the world, we can 
observe an intensification of international efforts at cooperation on competition efforts in the last two 
decades. Efforts to establish a global competition regime started as early as 1947, with the draft 
provisions of the International Trade Organization (ITO) which included measures on restrictive business 
practices. These rules were included in the draft ITO against the backdrop of the 1930s, when 
international cartels had been widespread and were perceived to have been damaging to the world 
economy (Woolcock 2007, 2). The ITO never entered into force and the attempts at creating international 7
competition provisions were shelved. Efforts at competition policy cooperation in a multilateral trade 
forum did not pick up again until briefly in the 1960s—which were unsuccessful—and then much later at 
the Singapore WTO Ministerial meeting in 1996. 
In the meanwhile, bilateral venues have become significant for cooperation on competition policy. 
The first bilateral agreement on competition policy was between the United States and Germany in 1976, 
followed by an agreement between the US and Australia in 1982. Bilateral agreements on competition 
have become more significant and widespread in the late 1980s and 1990s. Most significantly, after a 
history of discord, the EU and the US signed a bilateral cooperation agreement on competition policy in 
1991. Both the US and the EU claim extraterritorial application of their competition laws, which had in 
the past led to frictions. The Bilateral Agreement seeks to address anticompetitive business activity that 
occurs outside the jurisdiction of one party, but adversely affects the interests of that party (Damro 2006, 
13). It emphasizes the practice of mutual notification by competition authorities during the initial 
decision-making process, and stresses consideration of the effects of enforcement activities on the other 
party. The Agreement also introduces ‘positive comity,’ a principle that allows one competition authority 
to request formal consideration of their national interests by a foreign counterpart (Commission 2008; 
Damro 2006, 13). 
The Bilateral Agreement was followed by the Positive Comity Agreement (PCA) in 1998, which 
encouraged competition authorities in one jurisdiction to request that their foreign counterparts conduct 
competition investigations on their behalf. The Administrative Arrangements on Attendance, concluded 
in 1999 is a non-binding effort to allow competition authorities of the EU and the US to attend certain 
stages of each others’ investigations on a case-by-case basis. These three bilateral agreements, along with 
increased contact of competition authorities of the EU and the US—the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General Competition and the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Antitrust Division—according to Damro (2006), has led to a more cooperative relationship between the 
EU and the US on competition policy issues. 8
In addition to the transatlantic relationship that has developed cooperatively since the early 1990s, 
both the EU and the US have concluded numerous bilateral agreements. The EU has formal bilateral 
agreements with Canada and Japan, association agreements with potential accession candidates (e.g. with 
some Balkan countries), and inter-agency agreements, such as with Korea. Furthermore, the EU 
cooperates with other countries in competition policy matters through free trade agreements or economic 
partnership agreements, such as through the trade agreement with Mexico, the partnership agreement with 
Russia, and EU-Mediterranean association agreements with Morocco and Tunisia (Commission 2008; 
Lowe 2006). The US has bilateral agreements on competition policy with Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel 
and Japan (Marsden 2003, 24-5). These bilateral agreements cleared the way for case cooperation and 
policy dialogue among competition authorities with positive results. For instance, the EU competition 
authorities cooperated with their counterparts on important cartel cases such as the international vitamin 
cartel, including the planning and coordination of dawn-raids on the companies under investigation (Lowe 
2006).
2
Bilateral agreements tend to be the easiest form of cooperation on competition policy because 
interagency trust and monitoring is easiest when only two parties are involved. However, the proliferation 
of bilateral cooperation agreements results in a patchwork of rules and norms, and therefore creates a 
complexities and anomalies for the competition authorities and the firms involved (Baker et al. 1997, 447-
8). Moreover, they may increase frictions and problems with third parties. Potential problems with 
national, bilateral and regional agreements highlight the need for multilateral cooperation on competition 
policy. Multilateral cooperation is advantageous because greater jurisdictional coverage increases the 
potential magnitude of benefits available from cooperation. However, the likelihood of achieving a far-
reaching agreement on competition policy decreases as more jurisdictions become involved, given the 
diversity of objectives, laws and enforcement mechanisms in different countries (Baker et al. 1997, 449). 
                                                
2 In 2001, the European Commission fined eight companies, including Hoffman-Roche, for their participation in 
cartels designed to eliminate competition in the vitamin sector. The fines amounted to more than Euro 800 million 
(Commission 2004, 2)9
Nonetheless, there are a number of multilateral forums through which countries have attempted to address 
international competition issues. 
The OECD has been involved in non-binding recommendations in competition policy enforcement 
since the 1960s. Various committees within the Organization have produced a number of reports and 
recommendations on different aspects of competition policy over the years, such as recommendations on 
methods of cooperation between its members, on exchange of confidential business information and on 
hard core cartels. The OECD approach has so far emphasized soft convergence on competition laws and 
their enforcement, and steered clear of any implication that uniformity among nations and a world 
competition policy agency is the goal (Doern 1996, 316). The OECD Competition Committee may be a 
particularly efficient forum for cooperation, since its membership is limited to developed economies that 
share broadly similar attitudes on cooperation. This has allowed the OECD members and the working 
groups to discuss the possibility of convergence over some core competition issues, without overt 
attempts at harmonization. However, the limited membership of the Organization prevents any agreement 
that may be reached here from being perceived as legitimate by developing countries (Campbell and 
Trebilcock 1997). 
Another non-binding multilateral forum is the UNCTAD. The involvement of UNCTAD in the area 
of competition policy is partly due to the vacuum created by the failure of the proposed International 
Trade Organization, which included rules on restrictive trade practices (Doern 1996, 312). In 1980, the 
UNCTAD adopted a Code on Restrictive Business Practices. The impetus for action on restrictive 
business practices partly came from the developing countries in the late 1970s, which raised concerns 
about possible anticompetitive behavior by multinational companies and these countries’ limited 
capacities to discipline such abuses (Benson 1980). These principles reflect the broad political spectrum 
of the United Nations, and recognize the need for preferential treatment for developing countries (Doern 
1996, 312).They also include principles of good conduct for enterprises including transnational 
corporations, which, again, reflect the interest of developing countries (Ibid., 312). Cooperation in 10
UNCTAD has produced the most detailed official multilateral agreement on business practices; however, 
the non-binding nature of the agreement detracts from its effectiveness. According to some observers, 
however, the Code has played a significant role in expediting the adoption of competition policies in the 
developing countries, which have flocked to the UNCTAD to learn more about the operation of 
competition policies (Sell 1995, 317-8).
The mixed success of these non-binding multilateral cooperation efforts have led policy-makers and 
scholars to turn to the GATT/World Trade Organization as a possible forum. In the early 1990s, a group 
of competition scholars—predominantly European, and particularly German, but also US and Japanese—
formed  a working group which published a Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC) (Drexl 2003). The 
DIAC proposed a competition code of minimum standards to be incorporated into the GATT and to be 
enforced in domestic jurisdictions. The enforcement of the Code was to be supported by an International 
Antitrust Agency, which would monitor compliance and act as dispute resolution body. The proposal 
received significant criticism from scholars and policy-makers in the US, and received only lukewarm 
support from Europeans (Gerber 1999, 127-8). 
Around the time that the DIAC was published, the EU was starting to push for its own vision of
global cooperation on competition policy. It was Sir Leon Brittan, the Commissioner responsible for 
competition policy in the EU, that revived the call for international cooperation on competition policy 
enforcement in the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1992 (Marsden 2003, 55). The US Department of 
Justice had serious concerns about bringing antitrust issues into the WTO, a binding multilateral trade 
agreement, but finally the US announced that it was willing to go along with other countries to begin a 
modest work program on competition policy (Marsden 2003, 57-8). In the 1996 Singapore ministerial 
meeting of the WTO, a working group on competition was set up with the task of studying the interaction 
between trade and competition policy. From 1997 until 2004, the Working Group on the Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy met three times a year to exchange ideas and identify areas of 
agreement and dissent (Marsden 2003, 60). In July 2004, the WTO General Council decided that the issue 11
of competition policy “will not form part of the work program set out in that Declaration and therefore no 
work towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the WTO during the Doha 
Round,” and ended the activity of the working group (World Trade Organization 2008). 
The strongest objections to multilateralizing competition policy come from the US authorities. The 
US policy-makers are concerned that  multilateral efforts would lead to a competition code that represents 
lowest-common denominator, and would thus weaken the US’ antitrust policy (Wood 2004, 185-6). They 
also see multilateral cooperation as an infringement on US sovereignty, and potentially an obstacle to the 
extraterritorial application of US antitrust laws.
3 The US has been very active in enforcing its laws 
extraterritorially in the past, which has led not only frictions with the EU, but also to resentment around 
the world. 
With increased economic globalization, the US anti-trust authorities have come to acknowledge the 
difficulty of competition policy approaches that rely solely on national laws and bilateral cooperation 
agreements (Pitofsky 1999, 166; Rill and Goldman 1997). Extraterritorial application of US antitrust rules 
encounters frequent legal and practical obstacles, particularly, in cases in which involved companies do 
not have any legal presence in the US. Often the key documents and witnesses are located abroad, out of 
reach of the evidence-seeking authority (Rill and Goldman 1997, 166; Weinrauch 2004, 93). For example, 
in 1994, a US court dismissed a criminal case which had been brought by the Department of Justice 
against General Electric, a Swiss affiliate of De Beers and two foreign nationals for conspiring to raise the 
price of industrial diamonds. The Court reasoned that much of the cartel behavior took place in Europe 
and the evidence was beyond the reach of the Department of Justice (Klein 1996b; Weinrauch 2004, 94). 
Additionally, it frequently proves difficult to craft meaningful remedies in antitrust cases when foreign 
companies have no assets within the territory of the US (Weinrauch 2004, 94).
The US antitrust authorities also gradually realize the limits of bilateral cooperation agreements. The 
                                                
3 US policy-makers emphasize that bilateral and regional agreements and ongoing efforts on multilateral cooperation 
do not prevent the possibility of rigorous extraterritorial application of US antitrust laws (International Competition 
Policy Advisory Committee 2000; Klein 1996a). 12
US has been successfully cooperating with its largest trading partners though bilateral agreements (Damro 
2006). One significant obstacle to continued reliance on bilateral agreements is the exchange of 
confidential business information in the context of such agreements. In the past, bilateral agreements did 
not allow for exchange of such information. The Clinton administration and the US Congress realized the 
limits this has imposed on the possibility of obtaining evidence in antitrust cases involving foreign 
companies, and passed the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA) in 1994 (Klein 
1996b). The Act gives explicit authority to the US antitrust agencies to negotiate bilateral antitrust 
cooperation agreements through which they can exchange evidence on a reciprocal basis with foreign 
antitrust agencies, and to assist each other in obtaining evidence located in the other’s country. The US 
has already concluded such an agreement with Canada, and is working on agreements with other 
countries and the EU. However, such agreements require explicit authorization in the laws of other 
countries for such exchange of information, and adequate safeguards for protecting confidential 
information. Zanettin and Ehlermann (2002, 131-4) point out that small countries have been skeptical of 
such agreements to share information between their antitrust agencies and the US, because they fear that 
such agreements may create or increase imbalances between the countries. Therefore, US attempts at 
concluding bilateral cooperation agreements that allow for such exchange of information have not been 
very effective.
The limits of extraterritorial application and bilateral agreements, and its reluctance to negotiate 
binding multilateral agreements has led the United States to pursue other means of international 
cooperation on competition issues. One such initiative was proposed by the International Competition 
Policy Advisory Committee of the US, which was established in 1997 to examine international 
competition policy issues, and which included a group of antitrust policy-makers and scholars. The 
Committee, in its final report published in 2000, found the WTO to be an inappropriate forum for 
discussing competition policy issues and suggested the creation of a “Global Competition Initiative,” a 
non-binding, new venue where government officials, as well as private firms and nongovernmental 13
organizations can exchange ideas and work towards common solutions to competition law and policy 
problems. This document reflected the type of multilateral effort that the US was willing to make on 
internationalizing competition issues: one that fosters “dialogue directed toward greater convergence of 
competition law and analysis, common understanding and common culture,” and that does not require a 
new international bureaucracy and funding (International Competition Policy Advisory Committee 2000, 
29). The initiative, which got the support of the EU and Canada, led to the launching in 2001 of the 
International Competition Network (ICN). The major goals of the ICN—a network of national 
competition agencies from developing and developed countries—are to support soft convergence in 
competition laws and enforcement, to improve cooperation and to establish non-binding best practices 
(Weinrauch 2004, 160). 
The US position on internationalization of competition policy has evolved over the years, but it is 
possible to identify some common threads in the perceptions and attitudes of the US policy-makers 
towards cooperation. A fairly stable concern of the US antitrust authorities has been the protection of 
sovereignty. The US has eschewed most attempts at cooperation that may have implications for its 
sovereignty in the antitrust area. For instance, the Congress failed to ratify the Havana Charter of the 
failed International Trade Organization in the 1940s partly due to sovereignty concerns. The Draft 
International Antitrust Code of the mid-1990s was also criticized by the US antitrust agencies and some 
scholars because of its proposal to set up a binding international dispute resolution procedure in antitrust 
(Gerber 1999, 130). The US instead has supported bilateral and non-binding multilateral mechanisms for 
cooperation. The support for bilateral agreements with like-minded states arises partly from the fact that 
such agreements with the largest trade partners of the US can potentially help the US antitrust agencies 
achieve most of their objectives with minimal infringement on US sovereignty. 
A second broad trend in the US attitudes towards competition policy cooperation is a preference for 
informal forums such as UNCTAD, OECD and the more recent ICN. Among these the US has especially 
been keen on efforts at soft convergence within the context of the OECD and the ICN. Gerber (1999) 14
argues that policy-makers and scholars in the US have great confidence in the strategy of convergence to 
solve the problems emerging from international competition issues. For instance, Joel Klein, the former 
Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, frequently emphasized that 
“a culture of competition will emerge out of discussing of competition law issues among competition law 
authorities, and growing awareness of the benefits of a competition-based system and this culture of 
competition will lead to greater convergence among competition law systems” (Gerber 1999, 132 fn.22). 
Similarly, former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission Robert Pitofsky emphasizes the 
significance of informal convergence by ‘learning’ (Pitofsky 1999, 410). 
According to Gerber, US commentators’ confidence in convergence stems from their belief that there 
is an identifiable and objectively verifiable “better way” for antitrust law and policy, and that this better 
way tends to be similar to or identical with US antitrust law (Gerber 1999, 133). This is also consistent, 
Gerber argues, with aspects of the US legal experience, as during the last two decades US law and 
economics scholarship has challenged the intellectual underpinnings of the US antitrust law. The rise of 
the Chicago School approach to antitrust and its replacement of the earlier antitrust approach 
domestically, then, is an experience that the US policy-makers and commentators believe would be 
replicated internationally. Hence, policy-makers and scholars in the US perceive convergence through 
bilateral cooperation and informal, non-binding multilateral forums to be the appropriate approach to 
internationalization of antitrust. 
The EU’s Global Competition Policy Vision
Competition policy of the EU aims to prevent distortions to free trade in the single market. The legal 
basis for the policy can be found in Articles 81, 82 and 86 to 89 of the Treaty of the European Union 
(Articles 85-86 and 90-94 of the Treaty of Rome). The policy has two main objectives. The first is to deal 
with anti-competitive behavior of private firms. The second objective is to regulate uncompetitive 
behavior of member state governments, including state aid to industries and state owned enterprises. The 
Commission also examines mergers with a Community dimension to ensure that they do not impede 15
competition in the internal market.
In the decade following the founding of the European Economic Community, competition policy 
became an essential part of the common market project. After all, “there was little to be gained from the 
removal of tariff barriers and quotas if having promoted the free operation of economic forces through the 
free movement of capital, goods, people and services, private companies were to engage in collusive and 
other anti-competitive activities” (McGowan and Wilks 1995, 147). Following this logic the Commission 
gradually established a coherent regime regulating the anti-competitive practices of private firms. 
According to some observers, competition policy became the “first supranational policy” of the EEC 
(McGowan and Wilks 1995, X), being the sector in which the formal authority of the Commission and the 
Court is at its greatest (Andersen and Sitter 2006, 15). 
The European Commission has made the international aspect of competition policy a priority since 
the 1980s and has pursued various strategies to achieve international cooperation on competition. Two 
developments may account for the increased salience of the international aspects of competition policy in 
this period. First, the EU’s competition policy reached a level of maturity by the end of 1980s through the
gradual development and confirmation of the Commission’s power in this area in the 1960s and the 
1970s. In addition to the gradual maturation of the policy, the member states’ decision to complete the 
European internal market with the Single European Act (1987) further encouraged DG Competition to 
enforce the competition regime rigorously and increased the DG’s scope of action with the 1989 merger 
regulation (Devuyst 2000, 134). In a 1990 speech, Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan 
emphasized the new global vision: “Competition policy has come of age and must face up to the 
challenges of our interdependent world” (Devuyst 2000, 134).
Second, as is apparent from Brittan’s statement, there was growing concern with how global 
economic interdependence would influence the EU’s efforts to maintain competition in the marketplace. 
As economies become interdependent, the opportunities for cross-border anticompetitive activity grow. 
For instance, the number of cross-border acquisitions and mergers has escalated dramatically in the 1980s 16
(Campbell and Trebilcock 1997, 89). Since 1990, mergers have typically accounted for between one third 
to one half of all Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows, and by 1999 cross border mergers amounted to 
80% of all FDI flows (Damro 2006, 7-8). Such developments have meant that individual jurisdictions are 
no longer able to enforce merger control or detect and prevent international cartels and other types of 
anticompetitive activity with domestic competition legislation alone. Hence, the Commission considers it
necessary to tackle international competition policy issues. The EU pursues multiple objectives by 
internationalizing competition policy. It seeks to ensure market access to its companies, to tackle 
anticompetitive behavior originating outside the EU but that affects the EU market, and to make sure that 
its companies are not disadvantaged by different competition rules around the world. 
I argue that it is possible to identify five different strategies that the European Union has followed at 
times in order to influence the international developments in competition policy: a) a unilateral strategy of 
extraterritorial application of the EU’s competition rules, b) a strategy of coercing the EU’s weaker trade 
partners and candidate countries to adopt competition laws in line with those of the EU’s, c) signing 
bilateral agreements to achieve exchange of information and cooperation with relatively equal trade 
partners, d) using non-binding multilateral forums to influence world-wide competition policy trends, and 
e) using multilateral forums to achieve binding international rules on competition. These strategies are not 
mutually exclusive in that the EU has pursued them in combination at different times, and has had various 
degrees of success in realizing its objectives through these strategies.
The EU has not been shy to use its competition rules extraterritorially especially since the 1988 
Woodpulp decision of the European Court of Justice.
4 Both the EU and the US has acted on the principle 
that their antitrust laws can be applied extraterritorially when conduct outside of their borders has 
implications within their markets. However, this approach has its limits. Both among themselves and with
the rest of the world, the aggressive application of competition laws of the US and the EU antitrust 
authorities have led to problems and frictions. Extraterritorial application of antitrust rules encounters 
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frequent legal and practical obstacles, particularly in cases in which involved companies do not have any 
legal presence in the territory of the investigating state. Often the key documents and witnesses are 
located abroad, out of reach of the evidence-seeking authority (Rill and Goldman 1997, 166; Weinrauch 
2004, 93). Additionally, it is frequently difficult to craft meaningful remedies in antitrust cases when 
foreign companies have no assets within that territory (Weinrauch 2004, 94). Finally, the extraterritorial 
application of competition rules creates resentment towards the EU around the world.
The strategy of pursuing binding multilateral competition rules have proven impossible due to the 
objections of the United States and some developing countries. As discussed above, the US has been 
unwilling to cooperate on competition policy in the WTO context, as a global competition order—which 
may turn out to be less stringent than the US laws due to the lowest common denominator bargaining in 
this context—may come to replace extraterritorial application of US antitrust laws. Developing countries, 
in turn, are suspicious of a global competition regime because they perceive this as a strategy on the part 
of the economically powerful countries to gain market access for their companies (Weinrauch 2004, 43).
In between the unilateral and the multilateral strategies lie three other options, which have proved 
more successful than these two extremes. Among these three, I argue that the EU’s startegy of persuading 
and/or coercing its weaker trade partners and prospective member states to adopt competition rules based 
on the EU model has been the most effective. In the literature on EU external relations, the strategy of 
exporting EU rules and norms to surrounding countries is described as “external governance” or as EU’s 
use of “civilian power” (Duchêne 1972; Lavenex 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). As 
applied to internal processes of the EU, the governance perspective “concerns primarily the creation of 
rules as well as their implementation in national political systems”, while the external dimension is 
“exclusively about the transfer of given EU rules and their adoption by non-member states” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 661).
In competition policy, the strategy of external governance had an initial success with the 
incorporation of the member states of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) Iceland, Liechtenstein and 18
Norway into the European Economic Area (EEA), which brought them into the EU internal market with 
the adoption of the relevant acquis (Brittan 1992; Commission of the Euroepan Communities 2009).  All 
relevant Community legislation, including the competition rules are dynamically brought into the EEA 
Agreement, and the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the European Commission are responsible for the 
enforcement of competition rules throughout the EEA. In addition to this initial success of exporting EU’s 
competition rules to its neighbors, the European Commission took active part in incorporating 
competition and state aid provisions in the Europe Agreements signed with the Central and Eastern 
European countries in the early 1990s. As a consequence, all of the Central and Eastern European 
Countries adopted competition laws between 1990-1996, as seen in Table 2.
--- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ---
The transfer of EU’s competition rules to third countries did not stop there, however. Turkey adopted 
competition laws modeled on the EU’s prior to entering a customs union with the EU. With very few 
exceptions, all of the countries that have signed association agreements with the European Union adopted 
competition laws.
5 Many of them did so after they have signed the association agreements with the 
European Union. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which counts as members all of EU’s 
neighbors by land and sea (except for Russia, with whom a strategic partnership exists) and relies on 
bilateral, non-binding action plans also includes some competition provisions. The Cotonou Agreement 
which regulates trade and development assistance with the African, Pacific and Caribbean countries also 
include competition provisions, but the adoption of competition laws among these countries have been 
slower. Finally, the EU maintains structured dialogue and consultations with Korea and China.
Through these bilateral relations the EU has made significant progress in exporting its competition 
laws to countries in its neighborhood. The wider Europe and Central Asian regions have the highest 
                                                
5 Lebanon, for instance, does not have a competition law despite having an association agreement with the EU, but 
the Ministry of Economy suggests that it is in the process of drafting a competition law. A recent presentation titled 
“Competition Policy in Lebanon” was presented by two competition experts from the EU and one official from the 
Ministry. See the website of the Lebanese Ministry of Economy, [cited April 3, 2009]. Available  
http://www.economy.gov.lb/MOET/English/Panel/EconomicResearchAndPrices/EconomicResearch/Competition.ht
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proportion of countries that have adopted competition laws, as seen in Table 1. There are however, two 
limitations to the strategy of exporting EU competition laws. First, there is no guarantee that the adoption 
of competition laws will ensure that a viable competition regime is established in the country. It takes 
more than a commitment on paper to competition laws to establish a viable competition regime in a 
country. Second, as suggested in the literature on external governance, the main factor that influences the 
successful transfer of EU rules to countries outside of the EU is the offer of external incentives, and 
especially a credible prospect for membership in the case of applicant countries (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2008, 146; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 662). This suggests that this strategy 
becomes less useful for countries to which the EU cannot offer strong external incentives, for instance
those to which the EU cannot credibly offer membership prospects, or those that are not in the EU’s 
neighborhood in terms of geography and trade. Therefore, while this strategy has been very effective in 
the past to convince countries at the periphery of the EU to adopt competition laws, it may have reached 
its limits.
A second bilateral strategy which the EU has pursued is to conclude bilateral cooperation agreements 
with its stronger trade partners such as the United States, Canada and Japan. These cooperation 
agreements provide for the reciprocal notification of cases under investigation where they may affect 
interests of the other country, cooperation and coordination of competition authorities and positive comity 
procedures. Observers argue that these bilateral treaties, especially the US-EU Agreement which has been 
the most intensely studied, have proved very important to establish cooperative relations between the two 
sides. Damro (2006) argues that the agreement between the EU and the US gradually transformed what 
used to be a conflictual relationship into a cooperative one. Devuyst (2000) argues that despite the 
disproportionate media attention given to cases that involve conflict between the two sides, the EU-US 
relationship has been one of strong regulatory cooperation. 
These bilateral relations with EU’s powerful economic partners are preferable to a situation of non-
cooperation from the perspective of the EU, but nonetheless, these have certain disadvantages. First, as 20
the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger and the 2001 GE-Honeywell merger show, there is still 
significant scope for divergence and conflict among the two sides due to differences in competition policy 
principles and priorities and different methods of analysis (Morgan and McGuire 2004). Second, in 
contrast with its bilateral relations with its weaker trade partners which brings other countries’ laws closer 
to the EU’s, EU’s bilateral cooperation with the US may be leading to a convergence of the EU 
competition law with the US antitrust laws (Fox 2007; Pitofsky 1999). This may not be an altogether 
problematic development, but some scholars criticize the EU’s gradual move towards more neoliberal, 
market based competition approach following in the footsteps of the United States (Wigger 2007). 
Finally, the proliferation of bilateral ties more generally “would introduce complexities and anomalies, 
would be cumbersome when dealing with conduct which extends beyond a particular bilateral pairing, 
and would fail to capture the full potential benefits of widespread multilateral harmonization" (Baker et 
al. 1997, 447-8). Campbell and Trebilcock (1997) similarly argue that in the case of merger control, the 
co-existence of bilateral regimes may lead to interjurisdictional conflict between the rules and their
enforcement when the merging companies are located in different jurisdictions, or have significant market 
power in multiple jurisdictions. The shortcoming of bilateral and regional agreements is that “they capture 
only a portion of the trade of the member countries. As a result, system frictions with external trading 
partners remain a problem--indeed, they may even increase" (Campbell and Trebilcock 1997, 114).
A final strategy that the EU has pursued at the international stage is to become part of non-binding 
multilateral forums. The history of such non-binding cooperation goes back to the OECD’s efforts in the 
1960s and the UNCTAD’s activity on restrictive practices starting in the 1970s. A more recent effort at 
non-binding multilateral cooperation on competition, and one which is more comprehensive in its 
membership than the OECD and UNCTAD is the International Competition Network (ICN) which was 
launched in 2001. All three organizations work on the basis of exchanging information and experience, 
issuing non-binding recommendations and guidelines, identifying best practices and providing technical 
assistance for new or prospective competition law adopters. In its own words, the ICN “facilitates 21
procedural and substantive convergence in antitrust enforcement through a results-oriented agenda” 
(International Competition Network 2008). 
The EU and its member states take active part in these organizations to shape informal cooperation 
efforts on competition policy. Nonetheless, these organizations and their approach to competition policy 
cooperation have limits for the EU. The EU supported the establishment of the International Competition 
Network, but has not regarded it as an alternative to the involvement of the WTO in competition policy 
cooperation (Weinrauch 2004, 159). In addition the non-binding nature of this cooperation, what may be 
problematic from the point of view of the EU is the difficulty of controlling the agenda of cooperation in 
such an organization. The large and diverse membership, and the increasingly vocal role played by newly 
emerging economies in these organizations may prevent the EU from achieving cooperative results in line 
with its own competition policy approach. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Among the five different strategies of influencing the global competition policy agenda, the EU’s 
preferred method is a binding and multilateral framework on competition policy. This strategy was first 
mentioned by Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan n 1990. In 1995, an expert group 
commissioned by Karel van Miert, then EU Competition Policy Commissioner, published a report 
emphasizing that the EU should adopt a parallel approach of deepening its bilateral efforts and working 
towards a multilateral framework on competition principles (Commission 1995). The Report suggested 
that the geographical coverage of such a multilateral framework should initially include the industrialized 
economies, but in the long run seek to broaden to include developing countries as well. Due to the broad 
membership of the Organization and the complementary relationship between trade and competition 
policy, the Commission has regarded the WTO as the institution best suited to house such an agreement 
(Weinrauch 2004, 158). When this approach was rejected by the US International Competition Policy 
Advisory Committee, the Competition Commissioner Mario Monti expressed his disappointment 
(Wienrauch 2004, 159).22
This strategy was the preferred by the European Union, Gerber argues, because the framework 
approach which the EU suggests for adoption in the WTO corresponds to the basic mechanism of 
European integration (Gerber 1999, 138). The Treaty of Rome has been likened to a framework within 
which the European Community members have developed the norms, institutions and arrangements of 
integration. The evolution of competition policy in the EU itself also fits this framework model (Gerber 
1994). The competition law principles of the Treaty of Rome “have gradually been given form and effect 
through the interpretations and interactions of individuals, states, and regional institutions” (Gerber 1999, 
138; see also Cini and McGowan 1998). The EU officials therefore prefer an international competition 
framework under the WTO because this idea fits closely with their competition policy cooperation within 
the EU. 
Moreover, EU officials support binding multilateral rules, because compared to their US counterparts 
they are less optimistic about the possibility of a relatively smooth convergence of competition regimes 
around the world through informal and bilateral cooperation (Gerber 1999, 134). They see it equally 
conceivable that convergence will display discontinuity. Gerber argues that this stems partly from the fact 
that European scholars often tend to study not only their own systems, but US antitrust as well, and thus 
are aware of the different competition policy models and the limited possibilities for convergence (Ibid., 
134). National differences in competition policies of the EU countries, and their relatively slow and 
incomplete convergence (Amato 1997)—despite the fact that Rome Treaty included a strong commitment 
to competitive markets—might have also contributed to the European perceptions on the limited potential 
for convergence. Thus, the EU is more skeptical of soft convergence and has put more effort into 
multilateral cooperation as a means to achieve internationalization of competition policy. 
The failure of its WTO strategy in the face of objections from the US and developing countries has 
led the EU to intensify its efforts to pursue other strategies. As discussed above, other unilateral, bilateral 
and multilateral strategies have their limits as well. I argued in this paper that the EU has been most 
successful in spreading its competition principles in its neighborhood by persuading countries to adopt 23
competition laws modeled on the EU laws. This strategy works to ensure that the EU’s neighbors develop 
competition laws similar to that of the EU, and thus avoids the frictions that may result from the absence 
of competition laws or the emergence of different approaches to competition among the EU’s trade and 
investment partners. But this strategy may have reached its limits. Beyond its neighborhood, it is difficult 
for the EU to extend credible external incentives. The second bilateral strategy of concluding cooperative 
agreements with the US, Canada and Japan have kept serious conflicts between these countries and the 
EU to a minimum, but there is no guarantee that the EU will be able to achieve its competition policy 
objectives through these agreements. If anything, cooperation with the US antitrust officials may have led 
to the convergence of the EU competition policy practices towards the EU than the other way around. 
Moreover, bilateral agreements create a complex web of relationships which sometimes increases
frictions between the competition authorities. And finally, non-binding multilateral cooperation may not 
prove beneficial for the EU in pursing its competition policy objectives because it is difficult to control 
the agenda of such cooperation efforts to ensure that the outcome is favorable for the EU. This discussion 
suggests that the EU should continue to pursue the strategy of pushing for multilateral and binding 
competition rules at the international level. In combination with this, the EU could attempt to make its 
strategy of “exporting” competition rules to other countries more effective by focusing on the 
implementation of these rules once they are adopted. 
Throughout the paper, I have assumed that the EU is acting as a monolith in competition policy 
issues. This could be considered a valid assumption given the dominance of the European Commission in 
competition policy issues in the EU. Having achieved this dominance in intra-EU competition affairs, we 
can assume that the Commission dominates external relations on competition policy issues. This approach 
may be problematic in two senses, however. First, competition policy priorities of the member states may 
differ, and we may find that the member states pursue their own national interests in competition policy in 
the international arena in addition to the EU’s external efforts, and hence perhaps sometimes undermining 
and sometimes reinforcing the EU’s efforts. Therefore we need to pay attention to developments in the 24
external relations of the member states on competition issues. Second, we need to consider factors 
internal to the EU that may influence which external competition policy strategy that the EU will pursue. 
The EU’s external strategy may be shaped by intra-Community political dynamics, by the preferences of
the member states, or by pressures from different interest groups and firms. Thus, the external 
competition policy strategy of the EU may not simply be a response to developments outside of the EU, 
but may have to do with intra-EU dynamics and politics. Future research could explore the possibility of 
divergences within the EU on the objectives and the choice of strategies to pursue on international 
competition policy goals. This would give us a more complete picture of how and why the  EU chooses 
particular strategies in promoting competition around the world, and to what extent its strategy will be 
effective in reaching its objectives. 25
Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Number of countries that have adopted competition laws, 1950-2005.
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Figure 2:  Percentage of countries that have adopted competition laws in a region. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia and the Pacific 
Europe and Central Asia
Americas and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia26
Table 1: Countries that have adopted competition laws, broken down by geographical regions 
(World Bank Geographical Regions)
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Americas and 
the Caribbean
1
E. Asia and 
the Pacific
2
Europe and 
Central Asia
3
Mid. East and 
North Africa
South 
Asia 
Total 
% with 
competition 
laws 
(number)
26 %
(12)
71%
(20)
60%
(12)
92%
(46)
44%
(8)
57% 
(4)
60% 
(102)
1 The United States and Canada are included along with World Bank’s Latin America and Caribbean countries. 
2 Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Fiji, Samoa and Solomon Island are also included in this category. 
3 Member states of the European Union are included in this category. 
Table 2: The year of competition law adoption for the countries in the EU's neighborhood
Cyprus 1990 Belarus 1992 Malta 1994 Israel 1988
Hungary 1990 Bulgaria 1992 Turkey 1994 Tunisia 1991
Poland 1990 Finland 1992 Albania 1995 Algeria 1995
Czech Rep. 1991 Lithuania 1992 Switzerland 1995 Morocco 2001
Kazakhstan 1991 Moldova 1992 Georgia 1996 Jordan 2002
Latvia 1991 Azerbaijan 1993 Romania 1996 Egypt 2005
Russia 1991 Estonia 1993 Serbia 1996
Slovakia 1991 Iceland 1993 Armenia 2000
Norway 1993 Bosnia-Herz. 2001
Slovenia 1993 Croatia 2003
Ukraine 1993 Macedonia 2005
Montenegro 200527
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